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Custom is a key factor for economic performance, Social and economic institu-
tions build on it. The purpose of this paper is to reflect on the motivational force 
of custom per se. as brought about by history, History creates entitlements, and 
these influence behavior. Custom is thus understood as a set of behavioral 
dispositions inherited from the past. In this, the present considerations deviate 
from earlier approaches that take custom as being stabilized by external rewards 
and sanctions alone, (JEL: A14, NOO, A13, Z1) 
In troduction 
Custom is a key factor in social and economic interaction, Hs significance for 
every-day market transactions is patent. Contracting and co-operation rely on 
it. Social and economic institutions build on it, It forms an important part of 
socia! capitaL In all that, custom is of prime importance for economic perfor-
mance,l 
The purpose of this paper is to reflect on the interaction between custom and 
economic processes, I shall stress the motivational force of custom per se as 
brought about by history. History creates entitlements, and these influence 
behavior. Custom is thus understood as a set ofbehavioral dispositions inher-
ited from the past. In this, the present considerations deviate from earlier 
approaches that take custom as being stabilized by external rewards and sanc-
tions alone, 2 
* Thanks to Philipp Schlicht for bringing the game "Eleusis" to my attention, I wish 
to thank Gisela Kubon-Gilke, Eric Jones, Michael Kunkel, Timur Kuran, Hans-Jürgen 
Vosgerau, Barry Weingast, Ulrich Witt, Gerlinde Schäfer-Schlicht, Ulrich Schlieper, and 
Richard Swedberg for helpful comments on an earlier draft, 
1 On institutions and sodal capital as central determinants of economic performance, 
see Douglass NORTH [1990] and James COLEMAN [1988], 
2 See especially George AKERLOF [1976], [1980], Andrew SCHOTTER [1981]. David 
ROMER [1984], and Robert SUGDEN [1986], Karl-Dieter Opp's [1979], [1982], [1990] excel-
lent discussion of norm formation and norm dissolution goes beyond that because he 
takes recurrent behavior as a basis for norm formation, and I am following this approach 
hefe. CarI-Christian von WEIZSÄCKER'S [1983] idea of"adaptive preferences" and Timur 
KURAN'S [1987, 654-661] view of preference adaptation follow a similar idea, These 
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In the first part of the essay, I illustrate briefly the importance of custom for 
every-day market transactions. It is argued that custom renders many otherwise 
unfeasible transactions possible. Custom may however also block certain trans-
actions. There is a good and a bad side to it. 
Custom is shaped by past experience and will thus respond to long-term 
changes. In the second part I review therefore the position that custom adapts 
to economic circumstance, a position developed by Alfred Marshall. This view 
comes down to understanding custom as the equivalent to friction in the social 
world. Such a perspective fits nicely with various changes of customary ar-
rangements, but it can neither account for rigidities and inefficiencies of custom 
that we also observe, nor can it deal adequately with customs that are individ-
ually costly to obey yet not backed up by external sanctions. I turn therefore 
in the third part to a possible explanation for rigidity which builds on psycho-
logical dispositions of man. It is argued that we may understand the (limited) 
rigidity of custom in this way, but not the establishment and growth of a new 
custom. In part four I sketch the problem and argue that we must draw again 
on social psychology to gain some insight here. A conc1usion follows. 
1. The Place of Custom in Economics 
1.1 Custom, Entitlements, and Moralistic Aggression 
The efficiency of every-day market processes depends critically on customary 
ways ofbehavior. We pay after a taxi ride, and this cannot readily be explained 
with reference to untrammelled selfishness ofthe parties involved 3: I may fear 
retaliation by the taxi driver if I don't pay. However, after having handed over 
the money without receipt, our mutual bargaining position will not have 
changed in the least. The taximeter reading is still the same, the physical 
strength ofthe taxi driver appears as threatening as before, and I have still some 
cash in my pocket. So why does the taxi driver not insist that I pay again, and 
why shouldn't I comply if I did before? 
One possible answer is that moralistic aggression serves as an effective en-
forcement mechanism in these cases. The parties may be prepared to defend 
whatever they perceive as their entitlement, even if they can't expect any imme-
diate benefit from such an action, and even if it involves some cost to them.4 
Under such an assumption, the taxi driver would act aggressively if I tried to 
walk away without paying, and I would act aggressively if the taxi driver 
approaches relate to what I am going to describe as "adaptive custom" in seetion 2. 
I start from these ideas but try to go a step further. 
3 See Kaushik BAsu [1984, 5-7] for a pertinent discussion. 
4 See Benjamin KLEIN, Robert CRAWFORD and Armen ALCHIAN [1978,305], who refer 
to the biologist R. L. TRIVERS [1971] with regard to moralistic aggression. Gisela KUBON-
GILKE [1993] re1ates moralistic aggression to the more comprehensive notion of "re-
quiredness" in Gestalt Psychology. 
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requested me to pay twice. Both of us expect trus, and after calculating costs 
and benefits we both conclude that demanding and paying one fare is the 
preferred action for both of uso We may even skip the calculation if we went 
through similar episodes before and have acquired the appropriate strategy as 
a rnatter of routine. 
Many every-day transactions rely in this way on entitlernents which generate 
a threat ofrnoralistic aggression that stabilizes the transactions. This moralistic 
aggression is irrational in the sense that it would require each of the parties to 
engage in actions that would make them worse off. It is precisely trus psycho-
logical disposition to act in non-normal cases that sustains a smooth transac-
tion in the nonnal case. 5 
The importance of custom stems from the fact that it creates entitlements and 
preferences which shape econornic transactions in the manner described above. 
In this way, custorn may render rnany economic transactions possible without 
a need to rely on elaborate and costly safeguards. In this, custom may con-
tribute to econornic efficiency. 
Yet custorn is not always advantageous. Customary wage differentials may 
be maintained because people insist on maintaining them. This rnay block 
improvements in the allocation of resources. Further, the same mechanism that 
stabilizes the payment for a taxi ride may lead to costly conflicts. Assume that 
the taxi driver erroneously made adetour. He may feel that he is entitled to the 
full fare as shown by the taximeter, but I feel that he is entitled only to a 
somewhat srnaller amount, and a conflict may result that inflicts high costs on 
both of us. 6 
The motivational force of entitlements thus eases many economic transac-
tions, but the same behavioral disposition may yield very hannful consequences 
under other conditions. This may be compared with the laws of visual percep-
tion. They allow for remarkably efficient pattern recognition in every-day life, 
but under certain conditions they produce visual illusions. 
There are also other influences which contribute to generating entitlements 
and unleash the possibility of moralistic aggression - education, ideology, 
religion. All these influences join with custom to shape behavior. It seems 
appropriate, however, to concentrate on one factor alone, and I have chosen 
custom. 
5 This type ofbehavior may lead to a more desirable outcome in the long run and may 
thus be considered rational in a wider sense (Robert FRANK [1988], [1989, 13]). However, 
FRANK [1989, 6] notes a problem with this: "If there are genuine advantages of being 
vengeful or trustworthy and being perceived as such, there are even greater advantages 
in appearing to have, but not actually having, these qualities." The maxim "never tell a 
He" seems to be individually less efficient than the maxim "never tell a He if it can be found 
out, otherwise tell lies ifit is to your own advantage." Frank terms this the "problem of 
mimicry." But if mimicry is better than truthfulness, truthfulness c;m only be sustained 
by foregoing some gains. 
6 In a similar event reported by Erwin TOCHTERMANN [1992], the female passenger 
injured the taxi driver and smashed his spectacles. 
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Custom, understood in this sense, provides the groundwork of property and 
contracting, and therefore of economics in general. Property cannot be traced 
back to market exchange, since market exchange presupposes property. We 
may only say that a certain form of property emerges because it facilitates 
exchange, and this involves efficiency gains which render such an arrangement 
dominant in social evolution (John HICKS [1969, 33-34]). Such an argument 
does not explain where the behavioral impact of property emanates from, nor 
which form property might take. It presupposes all that. It says only: Ifprivate 
property rather than some other form is there, this will have beneficial results 
for society. In this sense, it contributes to our understanding of property, but 
it does not explain why the world changes if something is assigned as being the 
"property" of some person. The behavioral impact of property, which must be 
presupposed here, sterns from custom, and its importance derives from the fact 
that the assignment of property rights has behavioral implications. 7 
Or consider contracting itself: A contract is just an exchange of promises 
which are conditioned on each other, some sound waves, some patterns ofink. 
These promises entail that the contracting parties will obey these promises even 
if this is to their individual disadvantage if the other party makes a similar 
promise. The important point is here that contracts prevent some self-seeking 
actions in the future and therefore have behavioral impact. There would be no 
need to conclude a contract if it had no behavioral impact, and my promise to 
behave stricdy selfishly under all circumstances will not fetch a price. 8 
7 Note that the theory of property rights assignments proposed by Oliver HART and 
John MOORE [1990] is entirely based on the behavioral assumption that the assignment of 
property rights influences the bargaining outcome. Their behavioral assumption is that 
surpluses are split according to Shapley values, and this assumption - which is not based 
on any psychological or rational theory - drives their results. Another behavioral as-
sumption about the influence of "property" on bargaining would lead to other property 
rights assignments. (I owe this observation to the discussion in our "Kränzchen".) 
See Thrainn EGGERTSON [1990] for references and a survey of theories about property 
rights. 
8 I thus take contracts to deal with - possibly limited - conflicts, where it is in 
everybody's interest to default provided the other party observes the contract, and where 
the other party's obedience is brought about by my own promise not to defect. In 
contrast, pure co-ordination problems may be solved by simple agreements. 
Note also that the above discussion is simplifled in that third parties are not invoked 
in the argument. The main conc1usion is not affected by that however: Symbolic action 
must trigger the behavior of these parties. This can only work through motivational 
channels, since no real incentives are changed by my uttering of the words "I agree." 
Further, the argument is simplified in that the idea of "self-enforcing contracts" is not 
pursued. This idea refers to a contractual design where a party will lose future benefits 
if it interprets implicit understandings opportunistically (Benjamin KLEIN [1985]). Such 
a design rests entirely on shared notions of fairness and appropriateness and must rely 
on moralistic aggression as the ultimate enforcement mechanism. 
Kenneth ARRow [1990, 139] has stressed in this connection the fundamental nature of 
contracting for economics which presupposes a shared "language", a "kind of commer-
cial morality," and additional enforcement mechanisms. 
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The importance of custom to contracting carries over to economies in gener-
al, since contracting is central to economic processes. Market exchange, cer-
tainly one of the core themes in economics, is just one form of implicit or 
explicit contracting. lnstitutional economics as weIl as political economics, 
labor economics, and various branches of microeconomics have stressed that 
economic activity involves contracting from the outset. We even find the view 
that institutions in general are just clusters of individualistic contracts1 9 To 
stress that all contracts build on custom is ultimately to say that aIl contracts 
are relational contracts in some sense: They are embedded in a social whole (lan 
MACNEIL [1985]). 
1.2 Economics as a Propellant 0/ Custom 
Thus economies builds on custom. This suggests a relativistic - or rather 
culturalistic - perspective: We may take culture - the prevailing set of customs 
and interpretations - as parametrically given and start our analysis from that. 
This would ease our task in that we could leave the cultural issues to the 
sociologists, anthropologists, and psychologists. At the same time, it would 
render our task quite unsatisfactory since our conclusions would depend very 
strongly on our arbitrarily chosen assumptions about the cultural framework, 
and this would render them arbitrary themselves. 1o 
Such an approach is not feasible ifwe are interested in institutional matters. 
Economic processes shape custom. Custom is malleable and adaptive to eco-
nomic circumstances in many ways, and both institutional changes and changes 
of custom require the same time-scale to work themselves out. lf institutions 
shape custom and build on custom, we are not permitted to fix custom under 
a ceteris paribus clause save for purely hypothetical purposes. ll 
There are also important theoretical issues involved here. Our usual homo 
oeconomicus assumption neglects the behavioral impact of custom. Given the 
economic importance of custom, this is unsatisfactory, and we may try to 
render our view of human nature more adequate by facing the question, rather 
than by side-stepping it. Further, a theory about the formation and dissolution 
of custom will remove same of the arbitrariness in our (implicit or explicit) 
9 The view that institutions are just contracts has been elaborated e.g. by Michael 
JENSEN and William MECKLING [1976] and Armen ALCHIAN [1984] with respect to the finn 
and may be extended to other institutions. 
10 Thus economics should not be seen as "embedded" in social structnre, as some 
sociologists maintain (Kar! POLANYI [1977, 19-56], Mark GRANOVETTER [1985], and 
Sharon ZUKIN and Paul DIMAGGIO [1990]). Social structure and economic processes 
affect each other and there is no point in insisting that the one is "embedded" in the other. 
On a criticism of the view that social structure "logically antedates the market," see 
also Kaushik BASU, Eric JONES and Ekkehart SCHLICHT [1987, 6]. On the general issue of 
cultural relativism, see Solomon ASCH [1987, chap. 13], SCHLICHT [1990]. 
11 See BASU, JONES and SCHLICHT [1987, 6]. The "isolation principle" underlying this 
argument is elaborated in SCHLICHT [1985 a, chap. 1]. 
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assumptions which we have to make in economics. This will render our assump-
tions and results more reliable. 
It thus seems worthwhile to think about the interaction of custom with 
economic processes. The large issues are, however, too big for me. So I shall 
approach the problem by discussing some smaller topics, and I will not be able 
to settle even the small questions which I am going to raise. I can only hope that 
the questions are somewhat new and interesting. 
2. Adaptive Custom 
2.1 Dimensions of Growth and Erosion 
A custom - that is, an established behavioral rule in society - may be charac-
terized in two dimensions. 
Scope. A custom establishes a certain regularity. Whenever an event of a 
certain type occurs, it requires a certain response. Thus any custom has a 
certain scope of application. This scope of application is usually fuzzy. A taxi 
driver may expect a tip, but not necessarily the driver of the shuttle bus, and 
certainly not the pilot of an aeroplane. 
Level. Sometimes there is only a simple choice either to comply with a custom 
or not, but often the level of a customary obligation can be changed. A tip may 
vary in size. The level of a custom is usually fuzzy. The tip may be rounded in 
one or the other direction. 
We may thus think of a certain custom - like giving gratuities for certain 
services - as characterized by a general rule which links certain actions to 
certain events. The scope of the custom is given by the set of circumstances to 
which it applies. Its level is given by the intensity, if this can be varied. 
Further, a custom may be characterized by its strength: 
Compliance. This refers to obedience to the code. One way ofthinking ab out 
this would be to take compliance as measuring the relative frequency of obedi-
ence in situations where the custom applies. 
Growth and erosion of custom may accordingly take place in those three 
dimensions: Compliance may increase or deteriorate, the scope may expand or 
contract, and the level may go up or go down. 
Further we may thiDk of the rule itself as changing, leading to drift rather 
than simply to grOWth or decay. 
2.2 Custom as a Determinant of Economic Behavior 
Custom often takes the form of routines. Much of economic behavior is simply 
routine behavior, and in this sense guided by custom, often to the point that we 
are not aware of following it; it may be present as tacit knowledge in the sense 
of Michael POLANYI [1962]. Richard NELSON and Sidney WINTER [1982, 99] 
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propose "tlmt the routinization of activity in an organization constitutes the 
most important form of storage of the organization's specific operational 
knowledge." 
Often custom works by shaping norms which guide behavior. Daniel Kahne-
mann, Jack Knetsch and Richard Thaler have for instance argued forcefully 
that fairness perceptions influence economic behavior. They point to the fact 
that in many settings people prefer fair over unfair actions even ifthis is to their 
own disadvantage, and to punish unfairness, even if this involves some costS. 12 
Fairness standards are,. however, a matter of custom. As Kahnemann et a1. put 
it, a transaction is compared to a "reference transaction" and divergences are 
considered unfair. They emphasize that "the reference transaction provides a 
basis tor fairness judgements because it is normal, not necessarily because it is 
just." 13 In other words, the fairness standard is a matter of custom, along with 
many other social norms. 
Custom thU8 exerts normative force and 8trongly affects behavior, by in duc-
ing a preference to behave according to the custom, by creating entitlements, 
and by inducing moralistic aggression against deviating behavior. 14 
2.3 The Malleability of Custom 
Custom is, however, not a firm given on which our analysis can rely; it changes 
over time and adapts itself to new circumstances. 
First, custom refers to what is normal, it tends to perpetuate what has 
occurred before. This is confirmed by many psychological studies of adaptation 
which "suggest that any stable state of affairs tends to become acceptable 
eventually, at least in the sense that alternatives to it no langer readily come to 
mind. Terms of exchange that are initially seen as unfair may in time acquire 
the status of a reference transaction .... The gap between what people consider 
fair and the behavior they expect in the marketplace tends to be rather 
12 KAHNEMANN, KNETSCH and THALER [1986b, 736]; see also David SCHMITT and 
Gerald MARWELL [1972], Werner GÜTH, Rolf SCHMITTBERGER and Bernd SCHWARZE 
[1982]; and KAHNEMANN, KNETSCH and THALER [1986a]. 
13 KAHNEMANN, KNETSCH and TI-IALER [1986b, 730], emphasis added. See also Opp 
[1982,144-147] for a statement ofthe sequence recurrent behavior-preference formation-
norm formation from the point ofview ofmodern social psychology and SCHLICHT [1986] 
for a discussion of this from the point of view of Gestalt Psychology. 
14 As an illustration, there is currently a truck driver protest going on in France. It is 
now in its second week and has devastating effects on the French economy. The reason 
is that the French government wants to introduce a law which will lead to the withdrawal 
of driving licenses in case of repeated and severe traffic violations. The current practice 
has, however, created an entitlement on the side ofthe truck drivers to break the law, and 
this is not at all a unique event (Rudolph CHIMELLI [1992]). Quite often, custom is 
stronger than written law. Often written law adapts. 
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small." 15 Repetition focuses expectations on continuation. Custom establishes 
standards as a matter of mere inertia and releases the motives to maintain them, 
even at some cost. 
Second, custom is juzzy. It is never sharply defined, neither with regard to its 
scope, nor with respect to its level, nor with respect to required compliance. 
Alfred MARSHALL [1961 a, 638] has observed for instance that " ... the payments 
and dues which custom is supposed to stereotype, nearly always contain ele-
ments which are incapable of precise definition; while the accounts of them 
handed down by tradition are embodied in loose and vague impressions, or at 
best are expressed in words that make no attempt at scientific exactness." 
Similar statements could be made with respect to scope and compliance. 
Fuzziness allows for slight deviations. Persisting deviations will appear nor-
mal. In this way, a custom may be evaded by "gradual and imperceptible 
changes" (MARSHALL [1961 a, 559-560]). In this sense, custom is malleable and 
will react to econornic circumstance. 
2.4 Erosion 
Since custom is fuzzy and adaptive, this leads to erosion. If it is advantageous 
to corner the custom in borderline cases, this will be done and the custom will 
erode. Consider the following illustration. 
Level Erosion in Tipping. Think about tipping. Let C denote the customary 
size of the tip (the norm), and let c denote the size of the tip that the typical 
individual chooses. The individual tries to maxirnize his utility 
(1) u = u(c, d (C, cl). 
The individual prefers a low tip c for econornic reasons, and tries to minirnize 
the difference d between the size of the tip c and the social norm C in order to 
comply with the custom. The corresponding marginal utilities are negative, 
therefore: 
(2) Ue < 0, Ud< O. 
The deviation between the tip c and its norm C will increase with any increase 
in the difference between c and C and will be rninimized for c = C: 
(3) 
15 KAHNEMANN, KNETSCH and THALER [1986b, 731-732]. See also Brenda MAJOR and 
Maria TESTA [1989] who have shown that unequal treatment ofmen and women induces 
comparisons of men among themselves and women among themselves and reduces 
subjectively feit inequity thereby. It remains, however, an open question whether a 
persisting famine among the poor will induce people to consider this to be anormal state 
of affairs. 
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Utility maximization requires 
(4) 
and thus together with (2) and (3) 
(5) c< C. 
In other words: given that tipping costs 80mething, it will always be optimal to 
cheat slightly on the code. If custom i8 fully adaptive, the average level of 
tipping c - which is below C - will drive the customary level of tipping down 
and level erosion will result. 
Scope Erosion in Tipping. The problem of scope stabilization is similar. 
Consider again the custom of giving gratuity for "taxi rides." The concept of 
a taxi ride is fuzzy, however. This invites scope erosion. There will be borderline 
cases where it is unc1ear whether or not a certain trip actua11y constitutes a taxi 
ride that requires tipping. Economic self-interest will invite cornering the code 
in those borderline cases. If categorization proceeds in a purely adaptive fash-
ion, this will lead to a contraction of the scope of application. This process may 
continue until the custom is fully eroded. 
In a similar way we may speculate about compliance erosion. 
Ultimately, custom should be expected to adapt to incentives. We should 
expect erosion of a11 customs which induce individuals to forego their own 
advantage. Thus we should expect erosion of socia11y advantageous as weH as 
socially inefficient customs as long as it is not "individua11y rational" to pursue 
them. 
2.5 Custom as Friction 
Thus custom, seen in this way, "rounds off the edges of change" (MARSHALL 
[1.961 a, 641]). It does not block the effects of economic incentives but slows 
thern down. It plays "the same part in the moral world that friction does in the 
mechanical" (MARSHALL [1961 b, 140]). There would be no need to worry too 
much about the role of custom in economics. It would suffice to say that 
adaptive custom intro duces inertia. 16 
We may think that customs may be maintained by a system of sanctions and 
rewards which render the gains from compliance larger than the gains from 
defection (ROMER [1984]). This argument neglects, however, the problem 01' 
1'uzziness which will render stabilization difficult in borderline cases. There 
cannot be sanctions in borderline cases since it is unclear whether the custom 
has been observed or not, and thus the individuals' self-seeking behavior will 
govern growth or erosion. lt is on/y if the sanctioning rnechanism itself is not 
16 Richard SWEDBERG [1993] provides a more elaborate and complete discussion. 
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adaptive that custom may be preventedfrom adapting in a smooth manner. But 
the sanction mechanism itself is largely a matter of custom. For example, the 
caste system is sustained by a system of customary sanctions, and we should 
thus expect it to erode from its fringes. 1 7 This has, however, not occurred. 
3. Rigid Rules 
3.1 Rigidity 
The adaptive view of custom rules out any custom persisting that is individually 
costly to obey. We should expect erosion of such customs, quite irrespectively 
of whether they are socially beneficial or harmful. Yet many customs that are 
individually costly to observe have endured for a long time. Religious sacrifices 
provide examples.18 
Further, the same argument suggests custom adapts smoothly to slowly 
changing conditions. However, custom seems to be rigid to some extent, and 
continuously changing conditions may go along with discontinuous changes in 
the associated set of customs. 
By rigidity I refer to constancy over some range of conditions. Rigidity, so 
conceived, is always local or partial. Only small changes leave the custom 
unchanged, but large changes in circumstances may change the custom or even 
break it down altogether. 
Such rigidity is of central importance for the workings of custom. Any fully 
adaptive custom, even ifvery sticky, could only slow down the speed oftrans-
17 KURAN [1987, 662-664] vividly describes the social mechanisms which contribute 
to stabilizing the caste system. The argument which he advances seems to me, however, 
to be open to the erosion critique unless some psychological mechanisms are postulated 
similar to those out!ined in the following. 
18 Sometimes it is argued that sacrifices may serve usefu! functions and this explains 
their stability over time. Laurence IANNAcoNE [1992] has argued for instance that sacri-
fices may serve as screening devices. Apart from the functionalism problematic the 
general point against this is that many religious sacrifices are economically wasteful and 
might be substituted by equivalent productive or redistributive sacrifices. This should 
benefit both the individual and the congregation, but we usually don't observe that. 
(Nobody gains if I castigate myself. If I had to pay an equivalent fine, somebody else 
would be better off. Still we find that economically wasteful penances continue to exist.) 
Some religious practices are in fact extremely dangerous and harmful, like some 
incredibly drastic forms of circmllcision. Any alleged "function" of these practices can be 
served better by other means, but there is simply no sensible function in peeling the entire 
penis under the gamble oflethal infection and infertility. Erosion could occur quite easily, 
just analogous to erosion of tipping discussed in section 2.4 above: circumcisions could 
be performed less drastic, and this would drive down the standard. This has, however, not 
occurred. All this points to some important puzzles in the theory of institutions. (On male 
circumcision, see Nigel BARLEY [1986, 49], on female circumcision, see Sue ARMSTRONG 
[1991, 22], on economic aspects of this and related phenomena like "holy cows," see 
SCHLICHT [1993]). 
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mission of economic incentives. They would work faster otherwise. A rigid 
custom may however channel economic forces in an entirely different direction 
and affect economic performance significantly thereby. Further, a set of some-
what rigid customs may form an interlocking system with much greater overall 
rigidity. Such a system may appear as an independent, and even hostile, set of 
conditions which "lock in" the, very human actors who created it. 19 
Partial rigidity of custom mayaiso occasion the rigidity of institutions. This 
thought may contribute to an understanding of the apparent autonomy of 
institutions that seem to shape human action rather than emerge from the 
interaction of innumerous disconnected individuals. 
In the following, I shall sketch a mechanism that may lead to (partially) rigid 
customs. 
3.2 Customs as Rufes 
Customary behavior is rule-guided behavior. The rules of custom link certain 
situations to certain types of required behavior. These mIes must be learned, 
and this fact constrains their shape and may ultimately give rise to stickiness. 
Rule-Iearning involves the identification of constant, regular, and simple 
patterns that are then used to guide behavior. Thus mIes are acquired by 
induction. They extrapolate a given experience in the simplest possible manner. 
The reference to simplicity is important here, since any given experience may 
be extrapolated in infinitely many ways. Among those possible extrapolations, 
only the simplest are used, and this renders rule-learning possible. 20 
It is beyond the compass of this paper to discuss the nature of rules and rule 
formation in general. The points I want to raise can, however, be introduced 
by rneans of an example. 21 
19 I am referring here to "critical mass" phenomena, "network externalities," and 
related phenomena (SCHELLING [1978, chap: 3], SCHLICHT [1985 b], DA VID [1985]. KURAN 
[1987]. ARTHUR [1989], WITT [1989], Opp [1990]). Note, however, that even these phe-
nomena are vulnerable to erosion in level or scope. They are usually of loeal nature. 
Given this local eharacter, even strong network externalities will not ultimately prevent 
the spreading of a better substitute. If a better telephone system is available, a big firm 
will employ it internally even if it has not been established economy-wide. Other firms will 
behave alike, and the more efficient system will eventually spread. The touch-tone phone 
provides a case in point, and LIEBOWITZ and MARGOLlS [1990] discuss DAVID'S [1985] 
QWERTYexample. Similarly, a family or a religious eongregation may provide locally 
a sufficient critical mass and serve as a seed crystal for a better eustom. I am going to 
argue that such erosion may be prevented by eognitive and psychological mechanisms. 
That small micro rigidities may lead to pronounced macro rigidities is a eonjecture. 
20 I use the term to inc1ude interpolation. On the fundamental ambiguity of extrapo-
lation and the part of simplicity in mle learning, see also SCHLICHT [1979,55-61], [1984, 
64], on the role of simplicity in statistieal inference, see Roy HARROD [1956, chap. vi] and 
Harold JEFFREYS [1961,4-5, 47]). 
21 The subject is usually treated in a very nebulaus manner. Many arguments which 
build on the importance of mies leave open which feature distinguishes a rule from a 
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3.3 The Game 0/ Cards Eleusis 
The game of cards "Eleusis" illustrates the pertinent problems nicely.22 It is 
played as follows: One of the players, the "regulator", invents a rule for 
possible sequences of cards (such as alternating between "red" and "black") 
and secretly writes it on a sheet of paper. The cards are distributed among the 
remaining players, and each of them tries in turn to add one card to the 
sequence of cards in the middle of the table such that it fits the rule. If it does 
not, he has to take it back. Each of the active players tries to get rid of as many 
cards as possible in this way, and the regulator tries to maximize the difference 
between the result of the strongest and the weakest players by selecting a rule 
that is neither too complicated nor too easy. 
To illustrate the processes occurring here, consider the sequence of cards 
depicted in figure 1. 
This sequence is certainly compatible with many rules, such as: 
Ri: Play always club, diamond, spade, heart in sequence. 
R2: Alternate between black and red. 
R3: Alternate between playing IIp and down at each court-card. 
R4: After a King, play even, after a Queen, play"odd. 
R5: After a King, play up, after a Queen, play down. 
These are just a few of practically infinitely many possible rules. The typical 
way the game is played is that each player develops several hypotheses and tries 
to place cards which simultaneously conform to alt of these hypotheses. This 
llsually leads to mllch more restricted sequences than the original rule would 
permit. For instance, some players may initially suspect Ri to be true although 
the regulator has selected R2, and they have placed their cards accordingly. 
This will make R i very saHent, and all players will tend to llse this rule as long 
as they can, hoping that the others have to deviate and thereby generate new 
information. 
non-ruie. NORTIf [1990, 48] uses the term ten times on one page without explaining it, and 
BRENNAN and BUCHANAN [1985] have written an entire book on rules while leaving the 
term undefined! The present approach, which I am going to illustrate in the following, 
relies on psychological regularities of categorization and concept formation. 
The underlying theory is Gestalt Psychology (cf. e.g. Wolfgang KÖHLER [1980], 
Solomon ASCH [1987], Gisela KUBON-GILKE [1990]). Gestalt Psychology stresses that 
psychological organization tends to maximum elarity and articulation. This gives rise to 
rule formation. The German terms "Prägnanz" and "Gestalt" express this nicely. 
"Prägnanz" refers to elarity , simplicity, terseness, and articulation, and "Gestalt" refers 
to a pattern, rule or other form of integrated psychological organization. Using these 
terms, the tendency towards "Prägnanz" gives rise to psychological "Gestalten" such as 
rules. UnfortunateIy, the German "Prägnanz" is so elose to the English "pregnancy", 
which refers to something quite different, that I will refrain from using the term, although 
it is, apart from that, most appropriate and useful and an analogous English term is not 
available. 
22 The game was invented by Robert ABoTT [1973, 66-75]. 
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Further, if a certain hypothesis works very weH for a long time, but fails to 
do so in one instance, a player will usually not discard it altogether, but will 
look for a better hypothesis that is also compatible with his information. As 
long as he has 110t found such a better alternative, he will stick to his own rule 
even ifhe knows that it is wrong in some cases. It is, after all, better than playing 
randomly. 
3.4 The Formation oI Rules in Sodal Interaction 
The Eleusis game illustrates nicely how people learn rules. They form categories 
and look for regularities linking these categories. They can simply not learn by 
mere repetition, because each situation is new. (In the Eleusis game, the success-
ful cards and card sequences cannot be played again. They lie on the table.) A 
player can only succeed by forming a rule that generalizes previous experience. 
Many rules of social interaction are of this sort. 
Reallife differs, however, in that there is usually no regulator who secretly 
develops a rule that must then be detected. Rather, people perceive or imagine 
some rules and behave accordingly. This itself creates regularity. The individu-
als assume regularity in social interaction, and this creates regularity in sodal 
interaction. 
3.5 Rationality, Clarity, and Rufe Formation 
All this builds on certain basic psychological predispositions of man. There is 
simply no way to rationally decide which of the rules R 1 to R5 is the correct 
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one. People have to build on ideas about psychological salience of certain 
patterns. Rational strategies must build on this psychological information.23 
Such a view is not incompatible with rationality, it merely says that something 
more than rationality is required to select among the vast number of extrapola-
tions which can be conceived for any given observation. 
Further, the social world is in continuous flux, and nothing repeats itselfin 
an identical way. In such an environment, rule formation requires firstly form-
ing c1asses of "similar" cases. Once similar events are connected to outcomes, 
this permits generalization and rule formation, but such a process must build 
on a classification of similar events to begin with. The Eleusis game, for exam-
pIe, builds on categories like "red" and "black" suits, "court-cards", odd and 
even numbers, and so forth. Certain otner categorizations could also be made 
- in fact, any element of the power set of the deck of cards could be used as a 
category. But many categorizations -like drawing a distinction between primes 
and other numbers and building rules on that distinction - appear psycholog-
ically "unnatural" and are thus usually not used. 24 
3.6 Rigidity and Hysteresis 
Rule learning builds on the selection of simple patterns. The restriction to 
simple patterns introduces rigidity, because simple patterns lie apart; they don't 
form a continuum. A square is simple, a circle is simple, but intermediate 
figures appear less simple. We perceive them typically as modifications ofsome 
"prototype" figures like circle or square. 
A rule cannot always be simple, however. It may be that there is no simple 
rule available that fits certain sequences of events. But also in these cases, 
simplicity is important, since we try to conceive complicated rules as modifica-
tions or refinements of simple rules. In the "Eleusis" game, we will look first 
either only for colors or only for numbers. The simplest hypotheses will build 
only on these aspects. More elaborate hypotheses may be seen as combinations 
23 Game-theoretical approaches to rule formation, such as Andrew SCHOTTER'S 
[1986], must tacitly presuppose that people perceive certain patterns rather than others. 
The point has been deve10ped extensively by Thomas SCHELLING [1980] where the strate-
gie use of "focal points" is expounded. With regard to strategie interaetion he remarks: 
"Without fuH eommunication, one's ability to convey such a pattern of intentions is 
dependent [ ... ] on the eapacity of the other player to reeognize the formula (Gestalt) of 
retaliation when he sees a sampie of it." (SCHELLING [1980, 107]). See also Friedrich 
RAYEK [1962] on the partiaHy unconscious nature of rule formation according to Gestalt 
principles. 
24 On "naturalness" in categorization, see RaSCH et al. [1976]. Social categories follow 
the same pattern, see DAHLGREN [1985]. 
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of elementary hypotheses. We may thus see any actual rule as an appropriate 
modification of a still simpler pattern.25 
An initial hypothesis in the Eleusis game cannot be adapted smoothly if it 
failed on one occasion. The previous rule is also not "disproved" since it fitted 
OUT observations on many earlier occasions, and we don't have a better alterna-
tive. So we look for a refinement of our previous rule rather than for an entirely 
new pattern. This induces hysteresis: People will stick to the previous rule even 
if some evidence against it has accumulated. As a result, sequences of events in 
the past will influence to some extent the way in which we try to organize the 
currently available set of data, and the adoption of a new rule will be a 
somewhat discontinuous process. 26 
3.7 Cognitive Stabilization of Custom 
Ifwe now think about the formation, stabilization, and transmission ofcustom 
as involving rule-learning, we may gain some grasp of stickiness and hysteresis. 
Consider the erosion of tipping discussed in section 2.4 above. It has been 
argued that the typical individual selects his tip c slightly lower than the custom-
ary tip C in order to meet the conflicting ends of conforming with the custom 
and saving money. If the customary tip Cis 10% for example, the individual 
will pay only 9.5 %. The majority of individuals behaves in this mann er and 
cheats slightly on the code. Fram the point of view of rule formation, a tip of 
c = 9.5% will be perceived as a tip of approximately 10% and will thus spawn 
erosion. In this way, the simplicity requirement may stabilize the custom. 
More formally, we may think ofpossible customary levels oftipping as taken 
from the set of "prominent numbers" 
25 This hierarchical nature of mental constructs is a fairly general feature of psycho-
logical organization. In perception, memorization, and recall we usually relate an item to 
an adjacent c1earest case, termed its "schema", and refer to an item by noting the 
deviations from the schema. (ANDERSON [1980] provides a good overview. SCHLICHT 
[1979] relates these psychological regularities to "communicative stability" and presents 
an argument about the stickiness of structures for optimal data storage with respect to 
the amount of data. Cognate motivational and perceptional issues are discussed in 
KUBON-GILKE [1990, chap. 4]). 
36 Note that Jean PIAGET'S [1967] description of individual learning and Thomas 
KUHN'S [1970] view of scientific progress are formally akin to the process of rule-Iearning 
and involve similar rigidities. 
Ronald HEINER [1983] has proposed that complexity may give rise to the adoption of 
simple and inflexible mIes because the chance of acting wrongly is high under complex 
conditions and it is best to select modes of behavior which care only for the most 
important cases and neglect the rare events. Without evaluating this type of argument it 
should be clear that it must presuppose the - presumably psychological - concepts of 
"rule" and "simplicity" to begin with. Note that statistical inference itself is based on 
these notions and cannot deduce them (HARROD [1956, chap. vi] and JEFFREYS [1961, 4-5, 
47]). 
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(6) g; = {1 %, 2%, 5%, 7.5%, 10%, 12.5%, 15%,17.5%, 20%, ... } 
and the custom forms according to the function 
(7) C = C(c)eg; 
which selects that element of g; which is closest to current practice.2 7 If the 
desire to comply with the custom is sufficiently strong, the discontinuity intro-
duced in this way may be sufficient to prevent level erosion. 
A similar argument applies to scope stabilization. Categorization is not fully 
adaptive. Even social categories have to be "natural" categories in the sense 
that "artificial" categories cannot easily be implemented (DAHLGREN [1985]). It 
will for instance be nearly impossible to implement the category of a "laxi 
driver", which would be a "taxi driver with the letter '1' somewhere in his 
name" unless this category is supported by having relevance also in some other 
cases. (By implementation I mean here that the notion of a "laxi driver" is 
conceived as a primitive category from which the category of a "taxi driver" is 
derived as "a laxi driver with an arbitrary name.") 
Because categories are somewhat rigid, cheating on the code in borderline 
cases will not affect categorization, just as giving a tip of 9.5% will not erode 
but rather confirm the custom of giving a tip of 10%. This may prevent scope 
erosion. 
In the same vein we may speculate that compliance erosion may be prevented 
because people tend either to view a custom as being largely observed, or rarely 
observed, but will discount intermediate unclear cases.28 
4. Emanation and Dissolution of Custom 
4.1 Responsibility and Wages 
The general argument expounded here - namely, that psychological mecha-
nisms provide certain weak ratchets that may stabilize a custom - seems, 
however, to be incomplete. It does not explain how a custom like tipping may 
grow or spread. The Eleusis example also suggests, however, a means whereby 
a custom may emanate: If regularities emerge on the surface of the social 
27 ALBERS and ALBERS [1983] have introduced the concept ofprominent numbers into 
game theory. They have demonstrated that the concept is behaviorally important. The 
hypothesis that the experimental solution to any given game is an element of the set of 
prominent numbers is statistically very robust. Note that this observation has no "ratio-
nal" foundation at all. Note also that the set of prominent numbers differs among 
different number-systems. (Ten is prominent in the decimal sysfem, sixteen is prominent 
in the hexadecimal system.) This is, however, not an argument for cultural re1ativism and 
a possible plasticity of focal points, see Schlicht [1990, 118-126]. 
28 This refers to WULF'S [1922, 340] "Normalisierung" and "Pointierung" (levelling 
and sharpening) and to KELLEY'S [1973] "discounting principle." 
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system, people perceive them as rules which link certain courses of action. 
These rules serve as standards for the normal course of events. They generate 
entitlements and preferences to behave accordingly. Unjustified deviations may 
arouse moralistic aggression. In this way, psychological organization of reality 
shapes reality. 
As an example, EIliot JAQUES' [1976] sociological theory of wage formation 
may be re-interpreted in this manner (see SCHLICHT [1980]): Jaques argues that 
there exists a social norm that links wages to "responsibility." Responsibility 
i8 measured by the "time-span of discretion." This is the time during which the 
worker works on his own and cannot be supervised. Jaques demonstrates that 
socia! tensions result if this norm is violated. This induces the firms to comply 
with the norm and pay according to responsibility in order to avoid costs of 
cODflict. 
The weak point in this is, however, the postulate of the pay-responsibility 
link as an exogenous norm. The present cODsiderations suggest a way in which 
such a norm may come about: There is a simple economic argument for paying 
more for more responsible work. Thus economic forces may be responsible for 
establishing the pay-responsibility link. People perceive this as a regularity, and 
it thU8 becomes a norm. 
More responsible work can, by it8 very nature, be evaluated only after some 
time has elapsed. In order to be able to provide adequate incentive8, the 
workers doing more responsible work must therefore stay with the firm for a 
sufficiently long time. This would render it possible to establish an adequate 
incentive system. An obvious way to reduce labor turnover i8 to pay higher 
wages for the more responsible workers. (These workers have, aceording to 
Jaques, time-spans of diseretion up to several years.) Thus the firms themselves 
will be interested in paying according to responsibility. The pay-responsibility 
link appears as a social regularity and establishes itself as a custom. 
4.2 Rigidity, Hysteresis, and Malleability Again 
This kind of argument would, however, come down to the adaptive interpreta-
tion unless psychological elements are taken into account that may introduce 
rigidity and hysteresis. 
It may be, for instanee, that eeonomic forees generate the pay-responsibility 
link as a broad regularity, but that speeifie scarcities in some segments of the 
labor market generate exeessively high wages for work with low responsibility. 
This may lead to confliet rather than shape a new rule that aceommodates the 
practice. The rule "pay either according to responsibility or to seareity!" will 
not make sense as a rule because it seems not dear-eut enough, and henee 
arbitrary. This intro duces (limited) rigidity and eonfliet. 29 
29 As Hans-Jürgen VOSGERAU [1993] argues, conflict may arise also because different 
individuals may have different histories, belong to different groups, and therefore develop 
different customs. 
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At the same time, it induces hysteresis and the possibility that custom reflects 
earlier states of the world rather than current problems. Without doubt, this is 
important. The custom of tipping varies considerably across similar countries 
like the United States and Germany. Sometimes it varies even within one 
country. In Denmark, you give a tip to the taxi driver in the countryside, but 
not in Copenhagen. Thisis hardly explicable in purely economic (synchronous) 
terms. We should, however, not be satisfied with filling this gap in our thinking 
by uttering the words "culture" and "history" and leave it at that without 
trying to eIucidate in which way culture or history contributes to the formation 
or dissolution of custom. Given the importance of custom for economic perfor-
mance, we should not side-step the issue. 
Custom is, however, not rigid at all. What seems invariant is its reHance on 
rules and rule formation. In fact, custom changes all the time, but we seem not 
to observe it. This is not only so because "shortlived man has little better means 
of ascertaining whether custom is quietly changing, than the fly, born to-day 
and dead to-morrow, has ofwatching the growth ofthe plant on which it rests" 
but also because custom constitutes to such a large extent tacit knowledge, and 
we are not fully aware ofit even ifit changes rather quickly.30 
4.3 The Zipper 
As an illustration, take a custom that seems to emerge in many countries under 
congested traffic conditions and dissolve under more severe traffic conditions. 
In Germany, it is known as the "zipper" or "zipper principle". 
Consider a priority lane under heavy traffic conditions and a ramp from 
which cars are trying to enter the highway, as in figure 2. 
Under moderate congestion, drivers driving on the priority lane often tempo-
rarily waive their priority and permit one car to enter from the ramp to enter 
the priority lane. As a result, cars from the priority lane and cars from the ramp 
alternate. This is the "zipper". 
The custom is certainly beneficial in the sense that it permits traffic from the 
ramp under congested traffic conditions which would otherwise be blocked. If 
the custom is observed, everybody may be better off, since everybody must 
enter the priority lane from some ramp. 
Further, it seems dear that the zipper principle relies on simplicity. Alterna-
tion between cars from the two lanes seems to be a simpler rule than other more 
complicated rules like "two cars from the priority lane - one car from the 
ramp." Although these more complicated rules should be more efficient in 
some cases, we don't observe them.31 We may understand this along the lines 
discussed above: The simple rule is more dear-cut than more complicated rules. 
30 The quotation is [rom MARSHALL [1961 a, 640]. On tacit knowledge, see POLANYI 
[1962]. 
31 This qualifies somewhat the position taken by Donald WITTMAN [1982, 89] that the 
rules that emerge provide efficient solutions to the relevant problems. 
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Figure 2 
It is thus easier to cheat on complicated rules. This renders complicated rules 
more vulnerable to erosion. Further, complicated rules may be perceived as 
distortions of simpler rules, and tbis may establish the simpler rule even if it is 
less efficient. The simplicity requirement reduces the large set of conceivable 
rules to just one rule and introduces stickiness in tbis way. 
The practice of "zipping" can, however, not be understood from narrowly 
selfish behavior. Rather it seems to be induced by adesire on the side of the 
individuals to establish a behavioral rule for themselves that justifies their 
actions. The drivers perceive the problem that traffie from the ramp wou1d be 
blocked if the drivers on the priority laue insisted on their priority. They see 
therefore that insisting on priority is not a justifiable rule of behavior.t The 
problem suggests the zipper principle as a simple solution. Behaving according 
to that principle is justifiable, and people have adesire to behave according to 
principles whieh serve to justify their actions. They have a preference for 
self-justification. This may induce a driver on the priority lane to adopt the 
zipper principle as his behavioral rule. 
This behavior is strengthened by politeness. The drivers from the ramp will 
try to enter very early (at point A in figure 2) rather than at the end (point B) 
which is farther ahead (Incidentally, the German law mandates entering at B, 
but this is usually not observed). This suggests that the driver from the ramp 
tries to signal that he is not behaving selfishly, and the implieit threat is that he 
may pass to point Band try to find bis way aggressively there if he is not 
permitted to enter at point A in a polite manner. 32 This is consistent with his 
32 Politeness is, by the way, a fairly universal human feature, see Roger BROWN [1990]. 
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desire to be treated alike under similar conditions. He may even be inc1ined to 
develop moralistic aggression if he is not permitted to enter under such condi-
tions. Once a rule is backed up by moralistic aggression of that sort, however, 
the formal rules of traffk are fairly meaningless: It is always in anydriver's 
interest to yield to an aggressive driver. This will avoid a collision. Ultimately, 
the behavioral force of rules dictates the outcomes of these games of chicken. 
It is interesting that "zipping" breaks down under conditions of severe 
congestion, but reappears if conditions improve. It would be nice to have a 
theory explaining that in general terms, but I cannot offer it. The example may 
have illustrated, however, the importance of cognitive elements here. 
4.4 Queuing 
Another related practice to be observed in many situations is queuing. The 
following account stresses the subtle balance between the rigidity ofthe rule and 
the flexibility of the practice: 
A minor but simple example comes from the observation of a rudimentary group-for-
mation, that of food-queues in time of war. Despite their lack of permanence queues 
follow certain rough principles of organization. The queue is a form of order, governed 
by the rule "first come, first served". To this rule the majority of the members adhere 
c1osely. Should a person attempt to cheat, say by arriving late and imperceptibly edging 
his way into the line, there will be an outcry, and the line as a whole will take part ofthose 
who protest. Yet, the rule is not applied mechanically; the exceptions are, in fact, instruc-
tive. A member of his family may reHeve a person without arousing protest; also, when 
one has stood in the Hne a reasonable time he acquires the "right" to his place. Ifhe must 
leave temporarily he may resurne his place, and if newcomers protest the "senior" 
members will take his part. Old people and pregnant women may be allowed to go to the 
head of the Hne, even though there is some grumbling. It is also understood that one may 
purchase for one's family although one is not allowed to order for neighbors. It is true 
that this simple group formation is a function of prevailing practices and past experience. 
We cannot be certain that starving people in India would under similar circumstances 
form a queue instead of scrambling wildly. However, we cannot dispose of the problem 
by shifting it to the past. There was a time when people formed the first queues, when 
the considerations of which we speak did assert themselves. (ASCH [1987, 360]) 
4.5 Reflections on Tipping 
It is difficult to generalize these thoughts. Consider tipping. Certainly, the 
practice of giving gratuities may evolve in a similar manner. People may feel 
that tipping may serve as a mechanism to guarantee quality and want to behave 
so as to maintain it. While leaving the price mechanism essentially unaffected, 
it provides the possibility of a discount in case of insufficient quality. In t!ris, 
it can be viewed as a compensation package involving an incentive component, 
and this should be generally more efficient than simple payments without 
regard to quality. 
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It could be argued against this that such an argument should apply to a vast 
number of other transactions where quality is variable and cannot be contract-
ed on, but tipping is not usual. Yet I am not so sure about this objection. 
Actually, tipping can serve an incentive function only if quality can be readily 
observed by the customer, but is so ill defined that no objective criterion is 
available on which pricing could be based. These conditions are often not met. 
The butcher for example has ample discretion on the quality of the meat he 
seIls. Yet tipping could not work here as a quality enforcement mechanism 
because the quality of the meat cannot be judged in the shop, it can only be 
appreciated when it is consumed later on. In contrast, we can immediately judge 
the quality of the haircut, the service of the chambermaid, the help of the valet, 
or the alertness of the waiter, and we give a tip in these cases. This is also in 
broad conformity with the observation that you tip a generous policeman in 
some countries even if thi8 i8 illegal. 
Thus it seems that tipping relates to quality of the service. Yet this does not 
suffice. The services of a waitress in a cheap restaurant differ only marginally 
from the service offered by a McDonald's salesperson, but the one will expect 
a tip while the other doesn't. Thus c1assifications playa role. 
It seems, however, that tipping does notprimarily result from a concern of 
the individuals with social efficiency, but rather results from their individual 
craving. Tipping the policeman is not socially beneficial, but may be privately 
advantageous. It only happens sometimes that individual and social benefits 
coincide, as in queuing or zipping. 
There is, however, another line of argument that would not rely as much on 
a social concern of the individual. It relates to equity theory (Stacy ADAMS 
[1963]) and to social exchange theory (Peter BLAU [1955], George ROMANS 
[1961]). These theories hold that humans have adesire to reciprocate actions of 
others such that the value of what they receive is balanced with what they give: 
There is a tendency to equalize inputs and outputS.33 
Consider now a service of variable and ill-defined quality. Quality q is a 
random variable. It can only be appreciated by the consumer. Its minimum is 
qo and its expectation i8 Q. The posted price for this service is p* and the 
average price paid in the market in the past (the norm) is P. The customer is 
inclined to pay more than the average price if he obtains better than average 
quality since he behaves according to equity theory, and he tries to pay less than 
theaverage price ifhe obtains less than average quality. Re is, however, forced 
to pay at least p*. Thus the price paid by the customer is 
33 Note that the theory as such says not very rouch, since all kinds of entitleroents may 
be perceived as inputs. As William AUSTlN and Elaine HATFIELD [1980, 80l put it, "under 
thc right conditions, both exploiters and their victims are capable of convincing them-
se1ves that the most unbalallced of exchanges is in fact perfectly fair." It is only in 
conjunction with cllstomary ways of categorization that the theory is rendered empirical-
ly importanL 
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(8) p = max {p* . P + g . (q - Q)} , 
where g denotes the customer's generosity, i.e. the strength of his reaction to 
quality differences. 
Since the expectation of q is Q, the expectation of (P + g . (q - Q)) is just P. 
Thus the expectation of p will be above P if the posted price p* is binding. This 
will drive up P until p* ceases to be binding, and an average tip 
(9) 
has emerged. 
If we add the requirement that the tip is conceived as taken from the set of 
prominent numbers, we come up with a stable tip. 
4.6 Regufarities and Rufe Formation 
The view adopted here is that regularities lead to rule formation. These rules 
establish what is considered the normal course of events. They generate entitle-
ments and the motivational forces to behave according to those rules. In this 
way, custom is shaped. 
It seems clear that rule perception must build on psychological propensities 
of man. The motivational force of custom must emanate from the same source. 
The regularities, however, that give rise to rule perception and ultimately to 
custom may come about from quite unrelated reasons. Economic forces may 
bring them into being in a rather direct way, as in the example about the 
pay-responsibility link (section 4.1), but the psychological disposition for shap-
ing rules in order to solve a given problem mayaiso lead to the formation of 
regularities, as in the queuing example (section 4.4). This suggests that we 
should keep the problems of emergence of regularities and that of formation 
and stabilization of custom theoretically apart. . 
5. Conclusion 
I leave it at that. As I noted at the beginning, I see the main purpose of the 
present paper to pose questions rather than to offer solutions, and I hope I have 
done this. 
I have argued that custom provides the bedrock of economic pro ces ses, 
which renders it economically important. I have stressed that custom itself is 
influenced by economic processes, which makes it impossible to fix it under a 
ceteris paribus clause. We have to face the problem of analyzing the interdepen-
dence between custom and economics. Finally, I have pointed out that customs, 
as weIl as other rules of social interaction, build on the bedrock of psychological 
processes. This implies that we have to take account of these too. I apologize 
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for the many theoretical inconveniences implied by what I have said, but 
unfortunately reality is structured in such a theoretically repellent way. 
Zusammenfassung 
Die allgemeinen Usancen des gesellschaftlichen Zusammenlebens sind von 
zentraler Bedeutung für die Ökonomie. Das Anliegen dieses Beitrages ist, die 
motivierende Kraft von Sitte und Gebrauch in die ökonomische Betrachtung 
einzubeziehen. Es geht dabei um die Bildung von Verhaltensdispositionen aus 
der Erfahrung und nicht, wie bei einigen vorliegenden Ansätzen, um Verhal-
tensweisen, die allein durch externe Belohnungen und Bestrafungen stabilisiert 
werden. 
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